ODOMETER FRAUD, CALCULATION OF DAMAGES AND COUNSEL FEES FOR ODOMETER FRAUD
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Williams v. Finance Plaza, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 175 (Mo. App. 2002)
Finance Plaza, Inc., appeals the judgment following a jury trial in favor of
Byther Williams in her action against Finance Plaza for federal odometer fraud
involving a vehicle she purchased from Finance Plaza. 49 U.S.C. sections
32705(a) and 32710 (1997). Finance Plaza claims that the court erred in (1)
submitting to the jury instruction No. 7 regarding the measure of damages, (2)
submitting to the jury Williams' federal odometer fraud claim, and (3) awarding
Williams attorney's fees in the amount of $47,129.25. Williams asks this court
to award her attorney's fees incurred in this appeal.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Division One holds: (1) Where no evidence of Williams' disaffirming the contract
was presented, Finance Plaza's argument that restitution was the correct measure
of damages in this case is without merit. And while the submission of
instruction No. 7, which measured damages as the difference between the actual
value of the Tempo and the value of the car had it been as represented rather
than the difference between the car's actual value and the price Williams paid,
may have been error, manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice did not result
from its submission because the only evidence presented at trial regarding the
value of the Tempo, had it been as represented, was the sale price of the car.
(2) Where neither the things sued for nor the causes of action were identical in
the two cases, the doctrine of res judicata did not bar litigation of Williams'
federal odometer claim in the second trial.
[11] (3 Where Williams' claims of federal odometer fraud, state odometer fraud,
fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation involved a common
core of facts and related legal theories, the court was not required to
segregate attorney's fees for each claim. Additionally, where the attorney's fee
award amounted to a 4 to 1 ratio to the $12,000 damage award, and where Finance
Plaza presented a vigorous defense resulting in two trials and two appeals, the
award of more than $47,000 in attorney's fees was not excessive or an abuse of
discretion.
[12] (4) Because, under the Federal Odometer Act, Williams is entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees incurred to successfully defend her judgment on
appeal, the case is remanded to the trial court for such award.
[13] Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. Peggy Stevens McGraw
[14] Counsel for Appellant: Charles E. Weedman, Jr., and Jeannie Willibey.
Counsel for Respondent: Dale K. Irwin.
[15] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Robert G. Ulrich, P.J.
[16] Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Breckenridge and
Hardwick, JJ., concur.
[17] Opinion
[18] Finance Plaza, Inc. (Finance Plaza) appeals the judgment following jury
trial in favor of Byther Williams in her action against Finance Plaza for
federal odometer fraud involving a vehicle she purchased from Finance Plaza. 49
U.S.C. sections 32705(a) and 32710 (1997). Finance Plaza claims that the trial
court erred in (1) submitting to the jury Instruction No. 7 regarding the
measure of damages, (2) submitting to the jury Ms. Williams' federal odometer
fraud claim, and (3) awarding Ms. Williams attorney's fees in the amount of
$47,129.25. Ms. Williams requests this court to award her attorney's fees
incurred in this appeal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the
case is remanded with directions consistent with this opinion.
[19] Ms. Williams purchased a 1988 Ford Tempo from Finance Plaza for $6,995 on
November 10, 1995. At the time of the purchase, the odometer in the car showed
22,503 miles, and the salesman told her that the miles on the odometer were the
actual miles the car had been driven. Ms. Williams was presented with an
inspection certificate for the car that showed an odometer reading of 22,505
miles. She also signed an odometer disclosure statement. The odometer statement
provided that "the odometer now reads 22,503 miles." A box was also checked on
the statement that read, "I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the
odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in excess of the mechanical
limits." Ms. Williams testified that she did not see the checked box.
[20] Ms. Williams purchased the vehicle on credit and signed a note payable to
Finance Plaza. Finance Plaza sold Ms. Williams' note to Regency Financial
Corporation, and Regency, in turn, sold the note to Transouth Financial
Services.
[21] Ms. Williams had many mechanical problems with the Tempo from the time of
the purchase. The car would stall and cease running, it would not start, and it
leaked oil. In January 1996, Finance Plaza performed $1,300 of repairs on the
car. *fn1 In June 1996, when the car would not start, Ms. Williams called
Finance Plaza to complain, but she was advised that the company no longer
carried her note and that she should call Transouth. When she called Transouth,
Ms. Williams was told to take the car to a local Buick dealership to trade it in
for a dependable car. The Buick dealership discovered that the Tempo had been
driven over 100,000 miles, refused to accept it as a trade-in, and directed Ms.
Williams to take the car back to Finance Plaza. At Finance Plaza, Ms. Williams
spoke to the manager, who told her he could sell her another car. Ms. Williams
left with the same Tempo.
[22] Ms. Williams filed a four-count petition on November 10, 1997, alleging
federal odometer fraud, state odometer fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
negligent misrepresentation. In the first trial, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Ms. Williams on the federal odometer fraud count and a verdict in favor
of Finance Plaza on the fraudulent misrepresentation count, and Ms. Williams
dismissed the two remaining counts. Thereafter, Ms. Williams filed a motion for
attorney's fees. Finance Plaza argued that attorney's fees incurred on the
federal odometer fraud count only should be recovered. The trial court found
that such fees could not be fairly extricated from the total fees and awarded
Ms. Williams $37,095 in attorney's fees. On appeal, this court reversed the
judgment in favor of Ms. Williams on her federal odometer fraud claim due to
instructional error and remanded the case for a new trial on that claim only.
Williams v. Finance Plaza, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).
Although Finance Plaza also appealed the attorney's fees issue, it was not
addressed in the first appeal.
[23] Prior to the second trial, Ms. Williams filed a motion in limine asking the
trial court to prohibit the introduction of evidence regarding her voluntary
bankruptcy petition. The trial court sustained the motion and prohibited Finance
Plaza from introducing evidence of Ms. Williams' bankruptcy.
[24] At trial, Ms. Williams introduced requests for admission wherein Finance
Plaza admitted that it had originally purchased the Tempo on or about August 24,
1994, from John Chezik Honda, and at the time of the purchase, the odometer
registered 89,901 miles. Finance Plaza then sold the car to Michael and Carrie
Goad for $5,995 in September 1994, and at the time of the sale, the odometer
registered 89,920. Finance Plaza then reacquired the car and sold it to Ms.
Williams in November 1995.
[25] Ms. Williams testified that she believed that the actual value of the Tempo
with its actual miles driven in November 1995 was approximately $1,000. Richard
Diklich, an instructor in automobile technology for Longview Community College
and an automobile consultant, testified that the Tempo had a value of $1,500 in
November 1995.
[26] The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Williams for federal odometer
fraud and assessed damages at $4,000. The trial court's judgment favored Ms.
Williams with an award of three times her actual damages, $12,000, in accordance
with 49 U.S.C. Section 32710(a). Thereafter, Ms. Williams filed a motion for
attorney's fees. She requested a total of $47,347.50 in attorney's fees
consisting of $10,034.25 for the fees incurred in the retrial plus the $37,095
in fees awarded by the trial court in the first trial. The trial court awarded
Ms. Williams $47,129.25. This appeal by Finance Plaza followed.
[27] I. Instruction No. 7--Measure of Damages
[28] In its first point on appeal, Finance Plaza argues that the trial court
erred in submitting to the jury Instruction No. 7 regarding the measure of
damages based on the benefit of the bargain standard. Instruction No. 7
provided:
[29] If you find in favor of the plaintiff, then you must award plaintiff such
sum as you believe was the difference between the actual value of the Ford Tempo
on the date it was sold to plaintiff and what its value would have been on that
date had the Ford Tempo been as represented by defendant.
[30] Finance Plaza contends that the benefit of the bargain rule did not apply
because Ms. Williams disaffirmed the contract in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceeding.
[31] Finance Plaza's first point was not properly preserved for appellate
review. Although it objected to the instruction at trial, it failed to include
this issue in its motion for new trial. Hutchison v. Mo. Highway and Transp.
Comm'n, 996 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999); Lohmann By and Through Lohmann
v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 948 S.W.2d 659, 666 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). Thus, the
point is reviewed for plain error under Rule 84.13(c). Hutchison, 996 S.W.2d at
110. Rule 84.13(c) provides, "Plain errors affecting substantial rights may be
considered on appeal, in the discretion of the court, though not raised or
preserved, when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of
justice has resulted therefrom."
[32] Generally, Missouri courts apply the benefit of the bargain rule to
determine damages in cases of fraud and deceit. Heberer v. Shell Oil Co., 744
S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo. banc 1988); Sunset Pools of St. Louis, Inc. v. Schaefer,
869 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994). The benefit of the bargain rule awards
a defrauded party the difference between the actual value of the property and
what its value would have been if it had been as represented. Heberer, 744
S.W.2d at 443; Sunset Pools, 869 S.W.2d at 886. The benefit of the bargain rule
does not apply, however, where the purchaser rescinds and returns the property
received or where she received nothing of value. Heberer, 744 S.W.2d at 443. In
such case, the purchaser may seek restitution to recover the amount she paid
with interest from the date of payment plus incidental losses and expenses
suffered as a result of the seller's misrepresentations. Heberer, 744 S.W.2d at
443; Sunset Pools, 869 S.W.2d at 886.
[33] Finance Plaza argues that because Ms. Williams disaffirmed the contract to
purchase the Tempo in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, the correct measure
of damages was restitution rather than benefit of the bargain. Although Finance
Plaza discusses at length its view of the effect of the Chapter 13 proceeding,
the trial court ruled that evidence of Ms. Williams' bankruptcy was
inadmissible. Finance Plaza does not attack that evidentiary ruling in a point
relied on. Instead, it attempts to alter its point relied on in its reply brief
to assert that the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding Ms.
Williams' bankruptcy. Assertions of error made for the first time in a reply
brief do not present issues for appellate review. Pearman v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
48 S.W.3d 54, 55 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001). The sole purpose of a reply brief is to
rebut arguments made by respondents in their briefs, not to raise new points on
appeal. Id. Appellate courts are generally precluded from addressing assertions
made for the first time in a reply brief because a respondent has no opportunity
to address the new argument. In re Tri-County Levee Dist., 42 S.W.3d 779, 783 n.
2 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001). Finance Plaza's challenge of the evidentiary ruling in
its reply brief is, therefore, not addressed in this appeal. Because no evidence
of Ms. Williams' disaffirming the contract was presented, Finance Plaza's
argument that restitution was the correct measure of damages in this case is
without merit.
[34] The next question is whether benefit of the bargain was the correct measure
of damages in this federal odometer fraud case. The purposes of the Federal
Odometer Act are to prohibit tampering with motor vehicle odometers and to
provide safeguards to protect purchasers in the sale of motor vehicles with
altered or reset odometers. 49 U.S.C. section 32701(b)(1) and (2) (1997). A
person that violates the Act with intent to defraud is liable for three times
the actual damages or $1,500, whichever is greater. 49 U.S.C. section 32710(a)
(1997). The federal statute does not define the term "actual damages"; however,
the term was interpreted in the landmark case, Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc.,
425 F.Supp. 1381, 1388 (D. Neb. 1977):
[35] Although "actual damages" is not defined in the statute, it seems
reasonable to give it the meaning commonly applied to fraud cases. This is the
difference between the amount paid by the plaintiffs--not the value of the car
if it had been as represented--and the fair market retail value of a vehicle of
the type purchased with the number of miles actually traveled by the car, plus
such outlays as are legitimately attributable to the acts of the defendants.
*fn2
[36] The instruction in this case measured damages as the difference between the
actual value of the Tempo and the value of the car had the car been as
represented rather than the difference between the actual value of the car and
the price paid by Ms. Williams as interpreted in Duval. While the submission of
Instruction No. 7 may have been error, manifest injustice or miscarriage of
justice did not result from the submission of the instruction to the jury. See
Roy v. Mo. Pacific R.R. Co., 43 S.W.3d 351, 364 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001)(although
instructional error may have been prejudicial, it did not rise to level of plain
error). The trial court instructed the jury to consider only the evidence and
the reasonable inferences derived from the evidence, and the jury is presumed to
have followed that instruction. The only evidence presented at trial regarding
the value of the Tempo, had it been as represented, was the sale price of the
car. Cf. Morehouse v. Behlmann Pontiac-GMC Truck Serv., Inc., 31 S.W.3d 55, 61
(Mo. App. E.D. 2000)(in case for common law fraud and Merchandising Practices
Act violation where issue was sufficiency of the evidence of damages, value of
vehicle as represented on the date of sale was its sale price); Carpenter v.
Chrysler Corp., 853 S.W.2d 346, 363 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993)(in case for common law
fraud where the issue was sufficiency of evidence of damages, value of vehicle
as represented on date of sale was its sale price). The trial court did not
plainly err in submitting Instruction No. 7. Point one is denied.
[37] II. Submission of Federal Odometer Fraud Claim
[38] In the second point addressed in this appeal, Finance Plaza contends that
the trial court erred in submitting to the jury Ms. Williams' federal odometer
fraud claim. Finance Plaza contends that the judgment in its favor on the
fraudulent misrepresentation claim in the first trial was res judicata and
barred the submission of Ms. Williams's claim for federal odometer fraud in the
second trial. Specifically, it argues that both claims related to the exact same
conduct and that the verdict in its favor on the fraudulent misrepresentation
claim rebutted the intent to defraud element of the federal odometer fraud
claim.
[39] The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars relitigation of the
same cause of action by the same parties or privities in a case if the two
actions have the following common "identities:" (1) identity of the thing sued
for; (2) identity of the cause of action, (3) identity of the parties to the
action; and (4) identity of the quality of the person for or against whom the
claim is made. State v. Polley, 2 S.W.3d 887, 893 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). The
identity of the cause of action is defined as "the underlying facts combined
with the law, giving a party a right to a remedy of one form or another based
thereon." State ex rel. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co. v. Fairness in Constr. Bd. of the
City of Kansas City, Missouri, 960 S.W.2d 507, 514 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997).
[40] While Ms. Williams' claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and federal
odometer fraud were both based on Finance Plaza's oral representations to her
regarding the mileage of the Tempo, the causes of action and the things sued for
were not identical for purposes of applying the res judicata doctrine. *fn3
Under her common law fraudulent misrepresentation theory, Ms. Williams was
required to prove: (1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality,
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or his ignorance of the truth, (5)
the speaker's intent that his representation should be acted upon by the hearer
in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity
of the representation, (7) the hearer's reliance on the truth of the
representation, (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon, and (9) the hearer's
consequent and proximately caused injury. Pendergist v. Pendergrass, 961 S.W.2d
919, 923 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). Because no evidence was presented that she
rescinded the transaction, she sought actual damages measured by the benefit of
the bargain rule. Heberer, 744 S.W.2d at 443. A plaintiff in a common law fraud
case may also recover punitive damages if the offensive act is "outrageous
because of the defendant's evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of
others." Burnett v. Thrifty Imports, Inc., 773 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. App. S.D.
1989)(quoting Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. banc 1989)).
Conversely, under the Federal Odometer Act, Ms. Williams was required to prove
only a violation of the Act's odometer disclosure requirement, an intent to
defraud, and damages as a result. 49 U.S.C. sections 32705 & 32710 (1997);
O'Brien v. B.L.C. Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 64, 70 (Mo. banc 1989). The other
elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are not part of the action for breach
of 49 U.S.C. section 32705. O'Brien, 768 S.W.2d at 70. Additionally, the thing
sued for by Ms. Williams under the Federal Odometer Act was different than the
thing sued for under the common law fraud claim. Under the Act, Ms. Williams
sought three times the actual damages or $1,500, whichever was greater, and
costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 49 U.S.C. section 32710(a) and (b) (1997).
Unlike a common law fraud claim, the Act is remedial and must be construed to
give effect to its purpose. O'Brien, 768 S.W.2d at 70. The trebling of actual
damages and the award of costs and attorney's fees under the Federal Odometer
Act are intended to accomplish its remedial purposes and to encourage private
civil actions. Tusa v. Omaha Auto Auction, Inc., 712 F.2d 1248, 1255 (8th Cir.
1983); Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 578 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1978).
Because neither the things sued for nor the causes of action were identical in
the two cases, the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the litigation of Ms.
Williams' federal odometer claim in the second trial. The point is denied.
[41] III. Attorney's Fees
[42] In its last point on appeal, Finance Plaza claims that the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding Ms. Williams attorney's fees in the amount of
$47,129.25. It claims that Ms. Williams was required to segregate the amount to
each count of her four-count cause of action. It also argues that the award of
attorney's fees was excessive in relation to the verdict rendered.
[43] The American Rule requires litigants to bear the expense of their own
attorney's fees. Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 513 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001).
One exception to the American Rule is where a statute allows a party to recover
attorney's fees. Id. The Federal Odometer Act is such a statute. It provides,
"The court shall award costs and a reasonable attorney's fee to the person when
a judgment is entered for that person." 49 U.S.C. section 32710(b) (1997). The
trial court is considered an expert on the subject of attorney's fees. O'Brien,
768 S.W.2d at 71; Dominion Home Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Martin, 953 S.W.2d 178,
182 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). "Moreover, in the absence of contrary evidence, the
trial court is presumed to know the character of services rendered in duration,
zeal and ability, and to know the value of them according to custom, place, and
circumstance." Dominion Home Owners Ass'n, 953 S.W.2d at 182 (quoting Roberts v.
McNary, 636 S.W.2d 332, 338 (Mo. banc 1982), overruled on other grounds by
Keller v. Marion County Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. banc 1991)). An
award of attorney's fees will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Id. An award of attorney's fees will be reversed only if it is so
arbitrary or unreasonable that it indicates indifference or lack of proper
judicial consideration. Id. at 182-183.
[44] In determining the amount of reasonable attorney's fees, consideration
should begin with the rates customarily charged by the attorney's involved and
by other attorney's in the community for similar services. O'Brien, 768 S.W.2d
at 71. See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76
L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)(in determining the amount of reasonable attorney's fees, the
most useful starting point is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate). Another important factor to
consider in determining reasonable attorney's fees is the amount involved or the
result obtained. O'Brien, 768 S.W.2d at 71 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-435,
440); Tusa v. Omaha Auto Auction, Inc., 712 F.2d at 1255. This factor is
particularly crucial where a prevailing plaintiff has succeeded on only some of
her claims for relief. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. If the plaintiff's claims for
relief are based on different facts and legal theories and counsel's work on one
claim is unrelated to his work on another claim, the unrelated claims must be
treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and, therefore, no fee
may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful and unrelated claims. Id. at
434-435. See also Duchscherer v. W.W. Wallwork, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 13, 17 (N.D.
1995)(applying this principle from Hensley to a case involving violation of the
Federal Odometer Act). Conversely, if the claims for relief have a common core
of facts and are based on related legal theories and much of counsel's time is
devoted generally to the litigation as a whole making it difficult to divide the
hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis, such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a
series of distinct claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. See also Duchscherer, 534
N.W.2d at 17. Instead, where a plaintiff's claims are related and she has
obtained excellent results overall, her counsel should recover a fully
compensatory fee that should not be reduced simply because she has not prevailed
on every litigated claim. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. See also Duchscherer, 534
N.W.2d at 17. Furthermore, "[l]itigants in good faith may raise alternative
legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court's rejection of or failure to
reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee." Hensley,
461 U.S. at 435.
[45] In this case, Ms. Williams alleged four counts in her original petition:
federal odometer fraud, state odometer fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
negligent misrepresentation. An award of attorney's fees was appropriate only
under the federal and state odometer fraud claims if she was successful on those
claims. See 49 U.S.C. section 32710(b) (1997); section 407.546.1, RSMo 2000. In
the first trial, Ms. Williams prevailed on the federal odometer fraud claim, and
Finance Plaza prevailed on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The state
odometer fraud claim and the negligent misrepresentation claim were dismissed by
Ms. Williams before the case was submitted to the jury. Although this court
reversed Ms. Williams' judgment on the federal odometer fraud claim and the case
was remanded, Ms. Williams again prevailed on her federal odometer claim on
retrial receiving a damage award by application of 49 U.S.C. section 32710 of
$12,000.
[46] Having prevailed on only the federal odometer fraud claim, Finance Plaza
argues that Ms. Williams was entitled to attorney's fees incurred for
prosecution of that claim only. Finance Plaza cites O'Brien v. B.L.C. Ins. Co.,
768 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. banc 1989), in arguing that the attorney's fees should have
been segregated between Ms. Williams's multiple claims. The O'Brien case,
however, is distinguishable from the present case. In O'Brien, the plaintiff
brought two distinct claims. First, the plaintiff sought damages against an
insurance company for failure to title a vehicle as a salvage vehicle. Second,
the plaintiff sought damages under the state odometer statute for the insurance
company's failure to insert the odometer reading on the title to the vehicle.
The plaintiff recovered damages on each count. The trial court also awarded the
plaintiff $1,000 in attorney's fees for successful prosecution of the claim
under the state odometer statute. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the
trial court should have awarded him $28,000 in attorney's fees based on the
regular hourly rates of the participating attorneys. The Missouri Supreme Court
found that an attorney's fee award was appropriate only for the odometer
violation, that fees attributed to the salvage title claim may not be awarded,
and that segregation of the fees was required though such segregation may be
difficult. O'Brien, 768 S.W.2d at 71. Thus, the Court reversed the award of
attorney's fees and remanded the case for determination of an appropriate
attorney's fee award. Id. at 72.
[47] In O'Brien, the Missouri Supreme Court cited the case of Gollwitzer v.
Theodoro, 675 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984), in finding that attorney's fees
attributed to the salvage title claim may not be recovered. Gollwitzer is also
distinguishable from this case. In Gollwitzer, the plaintiff alleged in his
petition that the defendant violated section 407.020, RSMo 1978, the Missouri
Merchandising Practice Act, in the sale of a boat. At trial, however, the
plaintiff elected to submit the case to the jury on common law fraud. The jury
returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiff for actual and punitive damages, and
the trial court awarded plaintiff $4,205 in attorney's fees apparently under the
authority of section 407.025, RSMo 1978, of the Missouri Merchandising Practice
Act. The Eastern District held that the plaintiff, who elected to submit his
case under common law fraud, may not recover attorney's fees authorized by the
Missouri Merchandising Practice Act. Id. at 111.
[48] Unlike the O'Brien case, this case involved multiple counts with a common
core of facts and related legal theories. Ms. Williams' claims of federal
odometer fraud, state odometer fraud, and fraudulent misrepresentation all arose
from the same conduct with intent to defraud. Furthermore, her alternative
theory of negligent misrepresentation involved the same facts, Finance Plaza's
oral representations regarding the Tempo's mileage. And unlike the Gollwitzer
case, Ms. Williams submitted to the jury and prevailed on the federal odometer
fraud count. Because all of Ms. Williams' claims were related and intertwined,
the trial court was not required to segregate attorney's fees for each claim.
See York v. InTrust Bank, N.A., 962 P.2d 405, 430 (Kan. 1998)(where claims of
fraud, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and violation of the Kansas
Consumer Protection Act involved core set of facts and single transaction,
claims were inextricably intertwined, and trial court did not abuse discretion
in amount of attorney's fees awarded under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act);
Duchscherer, 534 N.W.2d at 19 (where claims of deceit and odometer fraud were
related and shared common core of facts and related legal theories, claims were
not separable for purpose of awarding attorney's fees under Federal Odometer
Act); DeSpiegelaere v. Killion, 947 P.2d 1039, 1044-1045 (Kan. Ct. App.
1997)(where claims of fraud and violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act
were based on the same facts and were intertwined to point of being inseparable,
the prevailing plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under the
KCPA for both claims); Majcher v. Laurel Motors, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 416, 430 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997)(where claims of federal odometer fraud and common-law fraud were
inextricably intertwined, trial court did not err in failing to distinguish the
time spent on each count in awarding attorney's fees under the Federal Odometer
Act). Cf. Slaymaker v. Westgate State Bank, 739 P.2d 444, 455 (Kan. 1987)(where
federal odometer fraud claim was not novel or difficult question because
defendants admitted they had failed to provide odometer statements, trial court
did not abuse discretion in awarding only portion of requested attorney's fees
in case that also involved an unsuccessful common-law fraud claim).
[49] Finance Plaza also argues that the award of over $47,000 in attorney's fees
was excessive in relation to the $12,000 damage award. As discussed in point
one, the Federal Odometer Act was enacted to "establish a national policy
against odometer tampering and prevent customers from being victimized by such
abuses." Duval, 578 F.2d at 726 (citation omitted). To accomplish its remedial
purposes, the Act provides for the recovery of treble damages or $1,500,
whichever is greater, and of reasonable attorney's fees. Id.; 49 U.S.C. section
32710(a) and (b) (1997). These provisions reflect the Act's intention to
encourage private civil actions. Tusa, 712 F.2d at 1255. "[I]n many situations,
the amount of damages under the Act will be so small that few attorneys will
pursue his client's case with diligence unless the amount of the fee be
proportionate to the actual work required, rather than the amount involved."
(quoting Duval, 578 F.2d at 726). In reviewing an award of attorney's fees in a
state odometer fraud case, the Missouri Supreme Court discussed this idea
saying, "It is the sense of the statute that private litigants aid the public
authorities in the enforcement of the odometer statutes, and that the cost of
litigation not stand in the way. Fees must be determined with this statutory
policy in mind." O'Brien, 768 S.W.2d at 72. Thus, where a remedial statute such
as the Federal Odometer Act requires an award of attorney's fees as an element
of recovery, a showing that the trial court's award exceeds the amount of
damages does not alone amount to an abuse of discretion. Duval, 578 F.2d at 727.
[50] An attorney's fees award must, however, bear some relation to the damage
award. Tusa, 712 F.2d at 1255; O'Brien, 768 S.W.2d at 71. The damage award in
this case was $12,000. After the first trial, Ms. Williams filed a motion for
attorney's fees requesting $39,970 and attached an affidavit showing counsel's
hours expended and his hourly rate. The trial court found the hours and rate
reasonable for the case and awarded attorney's fees of $37,095. *fn4 After the
case was remanded and retried, Ms. Williams filed a motion for attorney's fees
and an affidavit requesting $10,342.50 for fees incurred in the retrial plus
$37,095 in fees awarded in the first trial. The trial court awarded Ms. Williams
attorney's fees of $47,129.25 finding the amount fair and reasonable. This award
amounted to a 4 to 1 ratio to the $12,000 damage award. Such award compares to
other attorney's fees awards in other successful federal odometer fraud cases.
See Tusa v. Omaha Auto Auction, Inc., 712 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1983)(fee of
$8,000 and damages of $1,500 for a 5.3 to 1 ratio); Duval v. Midwest Auto City,
Inc., 578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1978)(fee of $14,000 and damages of $3,960 for a
3.5 to 1 ratio).
[51] Additionally, Finance Plaza was entitled to and presented a vigorous
defense that has resulted in two trials and two appeals. "A party 'cannot
litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily
spent' overcoming its vigorous defense." Duchscherer, 534 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d
466 (1986)). The Federal Odometer Act compels a party who violates the Act to
pay reasonable attorney's fees to a successful claimant despite a vigorous
defense. Id. Given the result obtained, the relationship of the claims, the
proportion to the damage award, and the vigorous defense by Finance Plaza, the
trial court's award of attorney's fees in the amount of $47,129.25 was not an
abuse of discretion. The final point is denied.
[52] IV. Attorney's Fees on Appeal
[53] Before submission of this case, Ms. Williams filed a motion with this court
requesting attorney's fees on appeal, which was taken with the case. *fn5 As
discussed in Section III above, the Federal Odometer Act mandates that
reasonable attorney's fees be awarded in the case of any successful action to
enforce the odometer statutes. 49 U.S.C. section 32710(b); Force v. McGeachy,
368 S.E.2d 777, 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). Refusing to compensate an attorney for
the time reasonably spent on appellate work defending a judgment would be
inconsistent with the intent of Congress in providing for an award of attorney's
fees. Fleet Inv. Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 505 F.Supp. 522, 524 (W.D. Ok. 1980).
Thus, Ms. Williams' request for attorney's fees on appeal is granted. See
Haluschak v. Dodge City of Wauwatosa, Inc., 909 F.2d 254, 258 (7th Cir.
1990)(plaintiff is entitled under the Federal Odometer Act to additional
reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with appeal); Fleet Inv., 505
F.Supp. at 524 (additional fees for services rendered on appeal may be allowed);
Force, 368 S.E.2d at 786-787 (in event the case is retried and plaintiff is
successful again, his counsel would be entitled to attorney's fees not only for
all proceedings at the trial level but also for his representation at the
appellate level). The case is, therefore, remanded to the trial court for an
award of reasonable attorney's fees for this appeal. See O'Brien, 768 S.W.2d at
71 (trial court is expert on subject of attorney's fees); Fleet Inv., 505 F.Supp.
at 524 (District Court has power and is proper forum to determine reasonable
attorney's fees for services performed on appeal).
[54] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded to
the trial court for determination of reasonable attorney's fees on appeal.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opinion Footnotes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[55] *fn1 Ms. Williams was only required to pay half of the invoice.
[56] *fn2 The Duval interpretation has been followed in other state court cases
such as Smith v. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 864 S.W.2d 817 (Ark. 1993), and Stepp
v. Duffy, 654 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
[57] *fn3 Under the election of remedies doctrine, the remedies in a common law
fraud case and a federal odometer fraud case are alternative and concurrent.
Freeman v. Myers, 774 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989). Thus, a plaintiff
may submit both claims to the jury but must choose one theory of recovery after
the verdict to prevent double recovery. Id.
[58] *fn4 The trial court did not allow $2,875 for fees it found duplicative.
[59] *fn5 Western District Court of Appeals Special Rule XXIX provides in
pertinent part: Any party claiming an amount due for attorney's fees on appeal
pursuant to contract, statute or otherwise and which this Court has jurisdiction
to consider, must file a written request before submission of the cause.
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