INTENT TO DEFRAUD AND FEDERAL ODOMETER STATUTE
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Owens v. Samkle Automotive Incorporated, 425 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 09/23/2005)
Glendale Owens appeals the dismissal of her amended complaint alleging that
Samkle Automotive violated the federal Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act
(the "Odometer Act" or the "Act"), 49 U.S.C. § 32701 et seq.*fn2 Title 49,
section 32710(a) of the United States Code permits a private party to recover
treble damages or $1,500, whichever is greater, from "[a] person who violates
[the Odometer Act] or a regulation prescribed or order issued under [the
Odometer Act], with intent to defraud[.]" 49 U.S.C. § 32710(a) (2000). The
parties do not dispute that Owens properly alleged that Samkle violated the
Odometer Act, and that it did so with the intent to defraud her. However, Owens
did not allege that Samkle intended to defraud her specifically with respect to
the vehicle's mileage, a fact the district court found fatal to her Odometer Act
claim. The district court held that "recovery under the Odometer Act is
permissible only when a plaintiff can allege and prove intent to defraud with
the respect to a vehicle's mileage."
Owens argues that the plain language of § 32710(a) contains no such restriction,
and an allegation of intent to defraud in connection with an Odometer Act
violation sufficiently states a claim under that subsection. We agree, and
accordingly REVERSE and REMAND this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND*fn3
Owens' amended complaint alleges the following facts. Samkle operates a car
dealership in Miami, Florida, known as "Marlin Mazda," from which Owens sought
to purchase a used car. Salespersons at the dealership showed her a 2002 Mazda
626, and told her that the vehicle was in "excellent" condition. Based on this
representation, Owens bought the car.
At the time of sale, the dealership required Owens to sign a battery of forms -
a power of attorney, an odometer disclosure statement, a motor vehicle
reassignment supplement, and an application for certificate of title
(collectively, the "Transfer Forms") - but not the car's original title, as
required by the Odometer Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 32705(a) (2000); 49 C.F.R. § 580.5
(2000). The Transfer Forms were not the official, secured forms issued by the
State of Florida as required by the Odometer Act, see 49 C.F.R. § 580.4 (2000),
and did not contain certain mandatory disclosures. See id. § 580.5. By having
Owens sign the Transfer Forms, Marlin Mazda transferred ownership of the car to
Owens without ever showing her the car's original title.
[15] Owens alleges that the dealership used the Transfer Forms, and not the
original title, to transfer ownership of the car, because it sought to conceal
what the title would have revealed - that the car was previously a short-term
rental vehicle owned by Hertz. She alleges that she would not have bought the
car at $25,858.00 had she known it had been a Hertz rental vehicle.
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[16] II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, taking
as true the facts as they are alleged in the complaint. Sosa v. Chase Manhattan
Mortgage Corp., 348 F.3d 979, 983 (11th Cir. 2003).
The Odometer Act allows private parties to recover money damages from those
that violate its provisions with the intent to defraud: "A person that violates
this chapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter, with
intent to defraud, is liable for 3 times the actual damages or $1,500, whichever
is greater." 49 U.S.C. § 32710(a) (2005). There is no dispute that Owens has
properly alleged violations of the Odometer Act. The complaint alleges that
Marlin Mazda, with the intent to defraud Owens, violated a "regulation
prescribed...under" the Odometer Act. Specifically, Owens alleged the violation
of 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(c), which provides that "[i]n connection with the transfer
of ownership of a motor vehicle, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to
the transferee in writing on the title ... ." (emphasis added). The Act defines
"title" as "the certificate of title or other document issued by the State
indicating ownership." 49 U.S.C. § 32702(7). Thus, the complaint alleged all of
the necessary elements required for a private cause of action pursuant to this
statute:
(1) that the defendant violated the Act or its regulations, (2) with intent
to defraud. Samkle argues that although it may have acted "with intent to
defraud" Ms. Owens when it concealed the title from her, the complaint still
fails to state a cause of action because the fraud referenced in the statute can
only relate to the vehicle's mileage. However, to accept this argument would
violate the first canon of statutory construction, which requires that courts
give effect to the plain and unambiguous language of a statute. "As in any case
of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the 'language of the
statute.' And where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends
there as well." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, (1999)
(quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 US 469, 475, (1992)). In
other words, courts must "presume that Congress said what it meant and meant
what it said." Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 770 (11th Cir. 2002).
On its face, this statute's meaning is direct, clear and unambiguous. No
language limits the meaning of the clause "with intent to defraud." Absent any
such limitation, the statute's meaning is clear - if you violate the Odometer
Act, and you do so with the intent to defraud your victim in any respect
relating to the Odometer Act or the regulations passed pursuant to it, you are
liable. Thus, the statute's plain language does not admit to the district
court's limiting construction, which reads words into the statute that do not
exist. United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002) ("If the
statute's meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for further
inquiry. The plain language is presumed to express congressional intent and will
control a court's interpretation.").*fn4 To augment the statutory language with
an additional element, never mentioned by Congress, that the fraud must be "with
respect to the vehicle's mileage" violates the cardinal rule of statutory
construction.*fn5
We do note, however, that a plain-language reading is also consistent with
the general principle that the Odometer Act is remedial legislation that should
be "broadly construed to effectuate its purpose," Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756,
760 (4th Cir. 1979) (construing the predecessor to § 32710(a)), and a plain
reading is not inconsistent with the Act's stated purposes.*fn6 Title 49,
section 32701 of the United States Code ("Findings and purposes") indicates that
the Odometer Act, as its title suggests, is aimed at preventing odometer
tampering and odometer fraud:
a) Findings. Congress finds that--(1) buyers of motor vehicles rely heavily
on the odometer reading as an index of the condition and value of a vehicle;
(2) buyers are entitled to rely on the odometer reading as an accurate
indication of the mileage of the vehicle; (3) an accurate indication of the mileage assists a buyer in deciding on
the safety and reliability of the vehicle; and (4) motor vehicles move in, or affect, interstate and foreign commerce.] (b) Purposes. The purposes of this chapter are--(1) to prohibit tampering
with motor vehicle odometers; and
(2) to provide safeguards to protect purchasers in the sale of motor
vehicles with altered or reset odometers. 49 U.S.C. § 32701 (2000).
Consistent with these purposes and findings, Congress established a
remedial scheme that not only punished violators, but deterred would-be
violators through a complex regulatory system that made even sophisticated
odometer fraud difficult to attempt unnoticed. The regulations include, as one
would expect, a flat prohibition on odometer tampering. 49 U.S.C. § 32703
(2000). However, Congress also mandated standardized disclosure requirements and
record-keeping procedures formulated to provide consumers with transparent
information about a vehicle's background, to ease investigation and prosecution
of violators, and to prevent would-be violators from taking advantage of titling
and registration loopholes to perpetrate odometer fraud. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §
32705 (2000) (setting forth disclosure requirements for transferring ownership
of a motor vehicle); 49 C.F.R. § 580.1 et seq. (2004) (specifying, among other
things, the content of odometer information disclosures and record keeping
procedures, and requiring titles and power of attorney forms to be printed using
a secure printing process); see also 49 U.S.C. § 32706 (2000) (conferring
investigatory authority and the power to require car dealers or distributors to
keep records of motor vehicle sales available for inspection by the Secretary of
Transportation).
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In particular, the disclosure and title regulations that Samkle allegedly
violated aim in part to thwart "title laundering," a practice unscrupulous
sellers employ to falsify the mileage listed on a car's title to conform with an
altered odometer reading:
Title laundering is a scheme commonly used by dealers involved in odometer
fraud. The main purpose of title laundering is to get a low mileage title from a
State motor vehicle titling office in exchange for a high mileage title. The
most basic form of title laundering is to simply alter the high odometer reading
on the title to a low odometer reading and apply for and receive a title
containing the lower reading. A more sophisticated scheme involves sending the
high mileage title to a State not requiring odometer readings on title documents
and obtaining a new title which does not contain an odometer reading.
Odometer Disclosure Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 27022, 27023 (proposed July
17, 1987) (later codified with modifications at 49 C.F.R. § 580.1 et seq.
(2004)).
Requiring mileage disclosures to be made on a securely printed title proved
critical to fighting title laundering. Prior to the 1988 revisions establishing
the present-day regulations, see Odometer Disclosure Requirements, 53 Fed. Reg.
29464 (Aug. 5, 1988) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 580.1 et seq. (2004)), federal law
required mileage disclosure only on a "federal odometer statement." Odometer
Disclosure Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. at 27023. A piece of paper separate from
the title, the odometer statement could be easily altered or discarded and did
not travel with the title. Id. Consequently, it did not warn subsequent
purchasers about the vehicle's mileage and ownership history, and did little to
curb title laundering. Id. at 27022-23. On the other hand, when the title itself
must contain the mileage disclosure and be shown to the buyer, a seller will
find it difficult to conceal the vehicle's history and true mileage. Id. Also,
to require the mileage disclosure directly on the title establishes a "paper
trail" for consumers and law enforcement to deter potential violators and help
apprehend sellers that break the law. Id. Similarly, the rule that requires
sellers to print titles and power of attorney forms using a secure process, and
states to issue power of attorney forms by the state, see 49 C.F.R. § 580.4
(2004), makes alteration or forgery of titles more difficult and creates an
official paper record tracing the vehicle's ownership.
In other words, the regulations at issue in this case are the "safeguards"
designed "to protect purchasers in the sale of motor vehicles with altered or
reset odometers" that are contemplated by the Act's purposes. See 49 U.S.C. §
32701(b)(2) (2000). They prevent unscrupulous dealers from using their own
procedures to mislead a purchaser about a vehicle's mileage - not only with
respect to the actual number of miles driven, but where those miles were driven
and by whom. See 49 C.F.R. § 580.2 (2004) ("The purpose of this part is to
provide purchasers of motor vehicles with odometer information to assist them in
determining a vehicle's condition and value . . . ."); Yazzie v. Amigo
Chevrolet, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248-49 (D.N.M. 2001) (holding that
allegations of specific intent to defraud with respect to the vehicle's mileage
are not required to bring suit under § 32710(a) when a dealer manipulated title
procedures in violation of the Odometer Act to hide the identity of the
vehicle's prior owner).*fn7 The identity of former owners, of critical import to
the consumer, is also critical to law enforcement, who rely on the chain of
title to ascertain the true ownership and mileage of a vehicle. See Odometer
Disclosure Requirements, 53 Fed. Reg. at 29468-69 ("Congress noted that '[o]ne
of the major barriers to decreasing odometer fraud is the lack of evidence or
"paper trail" showing incidence of rollbacks[.]' . Under [the title disclosure
requirements], the integrity of the paper trail has been maintained since the
disclosure will be on the title and consumers will be able to see the
disclosures and examine the titles for alterations, erasures, or other marks.
Furthermore, consumers will learn the names of previous owners that appear on
the title.") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-833, at 18 (1986) (committee report for
the Truth in Mileage Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-579, 100 Stat. 3309 (1986),
which modified the original federal odometer laws in the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-513, §§ 401-13, 86
Stat. 947, 961-63)).*fn8
Thus, the success of the complex remedial scheme Congress has created depends on
compliance with a multitude of interdependent and seemingly "technical"
provisions, such as those Samkle allegedly violated. Violations of these
"technical" regulations can defeat the entire remedial scheme - even if they are
not committed with the intent to defraud with respect to the vehicle's mileage -
by creating gaps in the vehicle's "paper trail" that: (1) thwart investigation
of future violations; and (2) make it difficult for future purchasers of a
vehicle to spot odometer fraud by preventing them from accurately assessing the
vehicle's ownership history.
Moreover, the language of § 32710(a) reflects Congressional intent to use civil
suits by private individuals to enforce compliance with even the most
"technical" provisions of the Odometer Act. To be sure, violators are subject to
both civil and criminal penalties for "technical" violations even if they commit
them without intent to defraud, see 49 U.S.C. § 32709(a)-(b), as well as to
suits for injunctive relief by the United States and the fifty States. Id. §§
32709(c), (d)(1)(A). But, as the former Fifth Circuit recognized, "unless a
violation of the [Odometer] Act can lead to [private] civil liability, the Act
is toothless." Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640, 643 (5th Cir. 1978); see also H.R.
Rep. No. 99-833, at 18 (1986) (justifying making odometer fraud a felony because
"[t]he Department of Transportation (DOT) believes that evidence indicates that
current criminal penalties for odometer tampering are not a sufficient
deterrent. According to DOT, many prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute
misdemeanor offenses and place very low priority on odometer cases because they
are misdemeanors."). Although a violator faces potential punishment from the
government, "such relief, although theoretically available, is unlikely. Private
prosecution is needed to make the Act effective." Nieto, 578 F.2d at 643.
Accordingly, Congress provided a private civil remedy to punish violators of the
Odometer Act, so that it would be "largely self-enforcing." H.R. Rep. No.
92-1033, at 20 (1972) (committee report for the Motor Vehicle Information and
Cost Savings Act of 1972, precursor to the present-day Odometer Act).
Therefore, to limit private civil suits under § 32710(a) only to instances where
the defendant intended to defraud the victim with respect to the vehicle's
mileage runs counter to the purposes of the private civil remedy - to compensate
victims for harm suffered, and to ensure strict compliance with the Odometer
Act's provisions. Both purposes are also reflected in the text of § 32710(a).
The violator must make the victim whole, but also must pay an additional price -
either double the actual damages or up to $1,500 - as a penalty for violating
the Act. 49 U.S.C. § 32710(a) (2000). It would therefore be inimical to the
private civil remedy's function as the Act's primary enforcement mechanism to
limit its reach to instances where the defendant intended to defraud his victim
"with respect to the vehicle's mileage." Such a reading neither comports with
the statute's plain language, nor accords with its remedial purpose.
Consequently, the district court erred when it required Owens to "allege and
prove intent to defraud with respect to a vehicle's mileage." Owens has alleged
violations of the Odometer Act committed with the intent to defraud, and that is
enough to state a claim under § 32710(a).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opinion Footnotes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[39] *fn1 Honorable Lloyd D. George, United States District Judge for the
District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
*fn2 Owens' amended complaint included various related state-law claims, over
which the district court had supplemental jurisdiction, by virtue of its
original jurisdiction over her Odometer Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(2000). When the district court dismissed the federal claim, it declined to
continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Owens' state-law claims, and
dismissed them as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2000) ("The district courts
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection
(a) if . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction . ."); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)
("When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in
state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in
its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should
decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without
prejudice.").
*fn3 For the purposes of this appeal, we only relate the factual allegations
relevant to Owens' Odometer Act claim.
*fn4 See also, e.g., Maxwell v. Moore, 63 U.S. 185, 191 (1859) ("[W]here the
Legislature makes a plain provision, without making any exception, the courts of
justice can make none, as it would be legislating to do so.").
*fn5 For this reason, we disagree with the court in Ioffe v Skokie Motor Sales,
414 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[A]n Odometer Act claim that is brought by a
private party and is based on a violation of § 580.5(c) requires proof that the
vehicle's transferor intended to defraud a transferee with respect to
mileage."). We believe the Seventh Circuit failed to apply the statute's plain
language, which unambiguously requires that a transferor of a motor vehicle
disclose the actual mileage to the transferee on the title.
Nor do we agree with Ioffe's construction of the "intent to defraud" language of
§ 32710(a) as a "shorthand designation for specific acts or omissions which
violate [the regulation]." Id. (citing United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971)). In Int'l Minerals, the Supreme Court held that, in
order to preserve the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse, a statute
punishing the "knowing" violation of the regulation in question (covering
description of transported hazardous material) must be construed to apply not to
knowledge of the regulation but to knowledge of facts which violated the statute
or regulation. Under § 32710(a), however, "intent to defraud" does not fall
within the same "narrow zone" in which the "mens rea" issue was raised in Int'l
Minerals. See id. At 560. In this case, "intent to defraud" is not an elemetn of
the prohibited conduct, but an independent requirement for a private claim
arising out of the violation.
[44] *fn6 See Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 464 U.S. 30, 36 (1983) ("As in all cases of statutory construction, our
task is to interpret the words of the statute in light of the purposes Congress
sought to serve.") (internal marks and citations omitted).
[45] *fn7 Indeed, a "significant part" of odometer fraud involves rental
vehicles like the one Owens allegedly purchased. H.R. Rep. No. 99-833, at 18
(1986) ("[The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration] said a
'significant part of [odometer] fraud involves vehicles which have been used by
lease companies or in business fleets.'").
[46] *fn8 Accordingly, the Secretary of Transportation rejected suggestions that
a dealer be allowed to substitute a "special power of attorney" form on secure
paper for the title in all cases. Odometer Disclosure Requirements, 53 Fed. Reg.
at 29468-69. This procedure, the Secretary stated, "would not allow transferees
to see the actual title document, including the disclosures, and could easily be
discarded. A forged substitute could then be submitted to the titling office" in
order to retitle the car with the false odometer reading. Id. at 29469.
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